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When Common Wisdom Is Neither
Common nor Wisdom: Exploring Voters’
Limited Use of Endorsements on Three
Ballot Measures
Craig M. Burnett & Mathew D. McCubbins

†

INTRODUCTION
Direct democracy has a tremendous impact on the policymaking process in almost every state. Twenty-four states have
adopted statewide ballot initiatives, a political institution that
allows citizens to propose and approve laws directly. Eighteen
of these states also allow citizens to submit constitutional
amendments for voters to consider by initiative. Twenty-three
states have enacted a popular referendum process—that is, the
ability of voters to force a statewide vote on laws the legislature
passes. Forty-nine states require voters to approve any legislatively proposed constitutional amendment via a referendum
(Delaware is the exception). Almost all Americans, then, are
1
governed in a hybrid-style republic, defined as a democratic
system that mixes elements of both representative and direct
democracy.

† Craig M. Burnett is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Appalachian State University (burnettcm@appstate.edu) and Mathew D. McCubbins
is Provost Professor of Business, Law, and Political Economy at the University
of Southern California (mmcubbins@marshall.usc.edu). We thank Daniel
Enemark, Elizabeth Garrett, Vladimir Kogan, Daniel Levisohn, Skip Lupia,
John Matsusaka, Colin McCubbins, and participants at the 2012 Minnesota
Law Review Symposium for helpful comments. Copyright © 2013 by Craig M.
Burnett & Mathew D. McCubbins.
1. See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett & Daniel A. Smith, Veiled Political Actors
and Campaign Disclosure Laws in Direct Democracy, 4 ELECTION L.J. 295,
296–99 (2005) (discussing some of the pros and cons of a hybrid-style republic).
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Despite widespread popular support for the institutions of
2
direct democracy, asking voters to consider policies via the initiative and referendum increases both the time and cognitive
cost associated with making democratic decisions. Countless
surveys have documented that citizens struggle to understand
3
basic facts about representative democracy. This finding has
caused many to worry that the increased costs that direct democracy places on voters is simply asking too much. Making
matters worse, research on direct democracy confirms that voters know even less about the measures they consider than they
4
do about the candidates they choose. Further, voters often re5
port finding ballot measures confusing, and this confusion is at
6
least partly responsible for increased ballot roll off —that is,
when an individual does not register a vote for a candidate or
issue on the ballot—on initiatives and referendums and voters

2. For some research on public opinion toward the institutions of direct
democracy, see Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan & Jeffrey A. Karp, Enraged or
Engaged?: Preferences for Direct Citizen Participation in Affluent Democracies,
60 POL. RES. Q. 351 (2007); Todd Donovan & Jeffrey A. Karp, Popular Support
for Direct Democracy, 12 PARTY POL. 671 (2006).
3. For a study that examines how information affects voters in presidential elections, see Larry M. Bartels, Uninformed Votes: Information Effects in
Presidential Elections, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 194 (1996). For a discussion of how
poorly constructed most individuals’ perception of the political world is, see
Philip E. Converse, The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics, in IDEOLOGY AND DISCONTENT 206 (David E. Apter ed., 1964). For a summary of what
individuals know about politics, see MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI & SCOTT
KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNOW ABOUT POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS
(1996).
4. A few studies that have examined what people know about the
measures they vote on include DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (1984); Craig M. Burnett, Does Campaign Spending Help Voters Learn About Ballot Measures?, 32
ELECTORAL STUD. 78 (2013); Bruce E. Cain & Kenneth P. Miller, The Populist
Legacy: Initiatives and the Undermining of Representative Government, in
DANGEROUS DEMOCRACY?: THE BATTLE OVER BALLOT INITIATIVES IN AMERICA
33 (Larry J. Sabato et al. eds., 2001); Arthur Lupia, Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 63 (1994).
5. SHAUN BOWLER & TODD DONOVAN, DEMANDING CHOICES: OPINION,
VOTING, AND DIRECT DEMOCRACY 67–68 (1998) (discussing the ways that less
educated voters are confused with ballot initiatives); THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL
198 (1989) (“Like any other democratic institution, the initiative . . . [has its]
shortcomings. Voters are sometimes confused.”).
6. BOWLER & DONOVAN, supra note 5, at 48–55 (discussing ballot roll
off).
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8

casting incorrect votes on some measures. Overall, the empirical evidence suggests that the prospects for voters casting
9
competent votes on initiatives and referendums are quite poor.
Despite the surfeit of data that indicts voters as incompetent policymakers, Arthur Lupia’s seminal work has altered
academics’ thinking about low-information voters in direct de10
mocracy. Lupia demonstrates that low-information voters can
cast competent votes without knowing specific facts about the
measure as long as they have adequate cues, typically in the
11
form of an endorsement for or against a ballot measure. Lupia
surveys a small swath of Los Angeles voters concerning five related car insurance initiatives on the 1988 general election bal12
lot. His findings demonstrate the effectiveness of endorsements: voters who acknowledged that they knew who endorsed
which of the five 1988 insurance initiatives reported that they
cast votes that are indistinguishable from votes cast by those
13
voters who have “encyclopedic” knowledge of the initiatives.
Despite the fact that Lupia argues—in the same article and
14
later —that cues are not a panacea for voters’ low levels of information, his results in this one election have nonetheless become the common academic wisdom: voters routinely use en15
dorsements to overcome their limited knowledge.
7. An individual casts an incorrect vote when she votes against her stated preference.
8. PHILIP L. DUBOIS & FLOYD FEENEY, LAWMAKING BY INITIATIVE: ISSUES, OPTIONS AND COMPARISONS 165 (1998) (“[Voters], when confused by ballot issues, are likely to . . . cast votes that do not reflect their actual point of
view.”); MAGLEBY, supra note 4.
9. For a review, see Michael S. Kang, Democratizing Direct Democracy:
Restoring Voter Competence Through Heuristic Cues and “Disclosure Plus”, 50
UCLA L. REV. 1141 (2003).
10. Lupia, supra note 4.
11. Id. at 65–66.
12. Id. at 63.
13. Id. at 63–64.
14. Arthur Lupia & John G. Matsusaka, Direct Democracy: New Approaches to Old Questions, 7 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 463, 469 (2004).
15. In his later work, Lupia carefully delineates the conditions when endorsements will and will not be persuasive. See, e.g., ARTHUR LUPIA &
MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA: CAN CITIZENS LEARN
WHAT THEY NEED TO KNOW? 184 (1998) [hereinafter DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA]
(finding that “a person’s willingness to follow a speaker’s advice depends
strongly and regularly on that person’s perceptions of the speaker’s knowledge
and trustworthiness”); Arthur Lupia & Mathew D. McCubbins, The Institutional Foundations of Political Competence, in ELEMENTS OF REASON 47, 66
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(Arthur Lupia et al. eds., 2000) (revealing that institutions can affect from
whom citizens can learn in the political realm); Arthur Lupia & Mathew D.
McCubbins, Learning from Oversight: Fire Alarms and Police Patrols Reconstructed, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 96, 111 (1994) (explaining how the inability of
legislators to make accurate inferences about bureaucratic agents’ hidden
knowledge makes legislators unable to manage bureaucratic policymaking);
Arthur Lupia & Mathew D. McCubbins, Representation or Abdication? How
Citizens Use Institutions to Help Delegation Succeed, 37 EUR. J. POL. RES. 291,
302 (1999) (explaining that not every piece of information is needed to make a
reasoned decision but only enough to make effective political inferences); Arthur Lupia & Mathew D. McCubbins, Who Controls? Information and the
Structure of Legislative Decision Making, 19 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 361, 361 (1994)
(stating that legislators often delegate policy making authority to experts and
accept the experts’ proposals without question). Thus, our argument is not
with Lupia, but his findings have been taken to be an unqualified endorsement for the efficacy of endorsements, and this broader, unqualified view permeates legal scholarship and political science. See, e.g., DANIEL A. SMITH &
CAROLINE J. TOLBERT, EDUCATED BY INITIATIVE: THE EFFECTS OF DIRECT
DEMOCRACY ON CITIZENS AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE AMERICAN
STATES 128 (2004) (“Scholars such as Arthur Lupia and Bowler and Donovan
have found that voters can make decisions consistent with policy preferences
in initiative elections by relying on available voter cues—such as the support
or opposition by political parties, elected officials, political elites, interest
groups, and the media . . . . [E]ven voters with less income and education can
make informed decisions in initiative elections with very minimal information
by relying on voter cues.”); Scott L. Althaus, Information Effects in Collective
Preferences, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 545, 546 (1998) (“They can do this by taking
cues from trusted political elites about which policies they should prefer and
by harnessing a variety of heuristic strategies to deduce their political preferences, thus avoiding the need to infer preferences from factual bits of
knowledge stored in long-term memory.” (citing, among others, Lupia, supra
note 4)); James H. Kuklinski & Paul J. Quirk, Reconsidering the Rational Public: Cognition, Heuristics, and Mass Opinion, in ELEMENTS OF REASON, supra
note 15, at 153, 155 (“Alternatively, [citizens] can consider the positions of interest groups whose policy preference they are generally inclined to support or
oppose. Such cues arguably eliminate the need for substantive information
about an issue.” (citing Lupia, supra note 4)); John G. Matsusaka, Direct Democracy Works, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 185, 198 (2005) (“In fact, the evidence suggests that information cues are fairly effective in allowing voters to make reasoned choices in the voting booth. In one of the most remarkable studies,
Lupia . . . found that uninformed voters could emulate the voting patterns of
informed voters simply by knowing the positions interest groups take
. . . .” (citing Lupia, supra note 4)); Monika L. McDermott, Voting Cues in LowInformation Elections: Candidate Gender as a Social Information Variable in
Contemporary United States Elections, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 270, 270–71 (1997)
(“For example, Lupia has shown that low-information voters can emulate the
decision making of high-information voters by using easily obtained cues in an
election. For complicated issues such as propositions or referenda, voters take
cues from the backers and opponents of different measures. As a result, voters
can still make decisions in line with their own preferences, without fully understanding a ballot measure. In the same way, voters can use cues about virtually unknown candidates to decide among them.” (citing Lupia, supra note
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Our previous research has demonstrated that accepting
this conventional wisdom as the core of an argument in support
16
of ballot measures is problematic and empirically untenable.
Our analysis of an initiative that proposed to modify California’s energy policy on the 2008 general election ballot shows
that voters did not appear to use endorsements to arrive at a
decision (though they seemed to vote in accordance with their
17
policy preferences). Our results—while also covering a small
number of respondents on only a few pieces of information—
call into question the assumption that voters’ use of endorse18
ments is widespread.
Using a novel dataset, we test the hypothesis that voters
routinely use endorsements to arrive at decisions on ballot
measures. Our data cover three ballot measures across two
elections in two states and represents one of the largest data
sets assembled on the topic of voter knowledge and competence
in direct democracy. Our first survey asks respondents about
North Carolina’s Amendment 1 on the 2012 presidential primary ballot. In particular, we evaluate whether President Barack
Obama’s or Governor Beverly Perdue’s public opposition to the
19
constitutional amendment had a significant effect on our respondents. For our second survey, we query Californians about
Proposition 28, a constitutional amendment proposed by initiative that attempted to alter the state’s legislative term limits,
4)). These five quotes represent just a fraction of the almost 1000 articles and
books that cite Lupia’s seminal article. Combined, these five articles have accumulated more than 1100 citations themselves.
16. See generally Craig M. Burnett, Elizabeth Garrett & Mathew D.
McCubbins, The Dilemma of Direct Democracy, 9 ELECTION L. J.: RULES, POL.,
& POL’Y 305 (2010) (suggesting that existing theories of voter choice, especially
in direct democracy, may be inadequate).
17. See id. at 306 (finding that “whether or not voters knew the voting cue
of the utility companies’ position against Proposition 7, [voters] were invariable in their ability to make vote choices that aligned with their stated policy
preferences”).
18. See id. (concluding that most voters cast their votes consistent with
their stated policy preferences even if they cannot recall cues such as endorsements).
19. See Luke Johnson, Obama Opposes Amendment One, North Carolina
Ballot Question Banning Gay Marriage, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 16, 2012,
4:20 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/16/obama-amendment-one
-north-carolina-gay-marriage_n_1354302.html; Perdue on Amendment One:
“We Look Like Mississippi”, WITN (May 11, 2012, 7:42 PM), http://www.witn
.com/home/headlines/Perdue_On_Amendment_One__We_Look_Like_Mississip
pi_151122875.html (citing the governor’s opposition to Amendment 1).
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and Proposition 29, an initiative that would create a statute
that aimed to increase the existing excise tax on tobacco prod20
ucts. For these two latter measures, we evaluate whether the
endorsements from eight prominent groups in the state, such
as the California Republican Party, had an effect on our respondents’ vote choices. The interaction of cues and voter characteristics on these three ballot measures yields fifteen tests
regarding the effectiveness of endorsements. Of the fifteen tests
of our hypotheses, we find that an endorsement has a significant effect on vote choice in just seven instances. For the subset
of the electorate for which the endorsement is effective, we often find the endorsement to be highly consequential, changing
vote probabilities by as much as 50%. While our findings lead
us to fine-tune the broad interpretations of Lupia’s research,
they also allow us to study the conditionality of endorsements
and heuristics in general. In the end, understanding the conditionality of endorsements leads us to provide a number of policy
prescriptions (e.g., including trustworthy endorsements on the
ballot itself) that could help improve voters’ abilities to cast “informed” votes on the increasing number of ballot measures they
face.
Importantly, our results highlight a major flaw with typical assessments of voters. For almost two decades, Lupia’s results have given license to many political observers to assume
away one of the most important—and most consistently observed—concerns with democracy: that states and localities are
increasingly calling on voters to make informed decisions on
complicated policy choices which they are woefully unprepared
to consider. We need to test in observational studies the conditions under which voters actually make informed decisions and
then assess how commonly those conditions occur. Our research
takes one small step toward this goal. We then need to propose
and debate changes in our political institutions that reflect a
broader understanding of the nuances of the conditions of persuasion, learning, and choice in elections regarding ballot
measures.

20. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, CALIFORNIA PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY ELECTION
TUESDAY, JUNE 5, 2012, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 7 (2012), available at http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/2012p.pdf.
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I. THE CONDITIONAL EFFICACY OF ENDORSEMENTS
For decades, the common assumption among scholars was
that voters did not engage the political world in a meaningful
way, and thus, voters were ill-equipped to make decisions on
21
Election Day. Lupia challenges the notion that voters with
limited information cannot make reasoned choices in elections,
specifically on ballot measures, with important implications for
candidates. Lupia and McCubbins formally define the conditions under which third-party endorsements can substitute for
22
knowledge. Using an agency-theory framework, Lupia and
McCubbins demonstrate that cue-givers can persuade individ23
uals only when the endorsement meets certain conditions.
The first condition is common interest. The individual receiving the endorsement must believe that she and the cuegiver share a common interest—that is, the cue-giver and individual both prefer the same outcome—regarding the choice at
24
hand. The existence of common interests establishes trust between the cue-giver and the individual. If the cue-giver and individual lack a common interest (which happens often in politics), the cue-giver can still be persuasive when an external
force or forces substitute for this common interest. An example
of an external force that can substitute for common interest is a
penalty for lying (e.g., perjury is a penalty for false testimony).
If cue-givers can be penalized (e.g., a fine) for giving a false recommendation, the individual receiving the endorsement can be
confident in the cue-giver’s sincerity. Additionally, the cuegiver can establish trust if they undertake an observable and
costly action to communicate their endorsement.
The second condition is knowledge. The individual must
perceive the cue-giver to be a knowledgeable source of infor25
mation about the subject. If the individual does not perceive
the cue-giver to have knowledge that the individual desires,
then the cue-giver will not be persuasive. Moreover, if the indi-

21. Most scholars attribute the genesis of this thinking to Converse, supra
note 3, at 245 (concluding that large portions of the electorate do not have
“meaningful beliefs” even on issues that have been extensively discussed by
political elites).
22. See DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA, supra note 15.
23. See id. at 92.
24. Id. at 166–74.
25. Id. at 158–66.
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vidual receiving the endorsements is already sure of her decision, the endorsement will not persuade the individual.
Additional experimental work has shown that endorsements can have dramatic effects on the quality of decisions.
Endorsements are so effective, in fact, that uninformed individuals who learn of an endorsement often outperform their
26
knowledgeable counterparts. The potential value of endorsements for individuals faced with a low-information decision
cannot be overstated.
As Lupia and McCubbins predict, however, usage of en27
dorsements by voters is not absolute. In particular, the individual may ignore an endorsement—despite the fact that the
endorsement satisfies the trustworthy and knowledgeable conditions—when she believes she can make the decision inde28
pendent of additional information. Moreover, in order for individuals to make use of endorsements, the endorsement must
be easy to understand and must be readily accessible and cost29
less (or nearly costless) to acquire. Overall, the expectation
from the experimental literature is that endorsements can lead
to substantial improvements in individuals’ decisions so long as
the two conditions for persuasion—common interest and
knowledge—are satisfied.
While endorsements are effective in a controlled environment, their application in real-world elections is less explored.
For candidate elections, party identification establishes com-

26. For research that examines the values of endorsements, see GERD
GIGERENZER, ADAPTIVE THINKING: RATIONALITY IN THE REAL WORLD (2000);
GERD GIGERENZER, GUT FEELINGS: THE INTELLIGENCE OF THE UNCONSCIOUS
(2007); GERD GIGERENZER, RATIONALITY FOR MORTALS: HOW PEOPLE COPE
WITH UNCERTAINTY (2008); GERD GIGERENZER, PETER M. TODD & THE ABC
RESEARCH GROUP, SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US SMART (1999); DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA, supra note 15; Cheryl Boudreau, Closing the Gap: When Do
Cues Eliminate Differences Between Sophisticated and Unsophisticated Citizens?, 71 J. POL. 964 (2009); BOUNDED RATIONALITY: THE ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX
(Gerd Gigerenzer & Reinhard Selten eds., 2001).
27. DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA, supra note 15, at 50.
28. Cheryl Boudreau, Gresham's Law of Political Communication: How
Citizens Respond to Conflicting Information 21 n.19 (May 17, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1017977.
29. Cheryl Boudreau, Mathew D. McCubbins, Daniel B. Rodriguez, &
Nicholas Weller, Making Talk Cheap (and Problems Easy): How Legal and Political Institutions Can Facilitate Consensus, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 868,
878–84 (2010).
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mon interest with voters so long as the parties are responsible—that is, they do not radically change their policy positions
30
from one election to the next. Party labels provide such a
strong cue to voters that even the most dismally informed vot31
ers can arrive at a reasoned choice in partisan contests. Party
labels are the easiest cue for voters to understand and the
cheapest to acquire: most voters share a common interest with
one of the parties, and party labels appear directly on the ballot, making party cues exceptionally accessible.
In direct democracy, the burden for endorsements to be
persuasive is substantially higher than in candidate elections
due to the fact that, often, the cues available in direct democracy elections fail to satisfy both of Lupia and McCubbins’s conditions for persuasion. Many groups supporting and opposing ballot measures fail to establish a common interest—and therefore
32
trust—with voters. For example, many interest groups concoct
33
names to confuse voters and hide the group’s real interests.
Since many of the groups sponsoring and endorsing ballot
measures lack the necessary external forces to establish trust,
many cues are unpersuasive.
Further complicating matters, it is more difficult and costly
for voters to acquire information in direct democracy elections.
Unlike candidate contests, endorsements are not printed on the
ballot for initiatives and referendums (though some states list
the legislative votes for referendums). In order for voters to
make use of endorsements they must have encountered the endorsement before they cast their ballot, which, given the dearth
of available information for many initiatives and referendums,
is not always guaranteed. Further, they must also recall the

30. ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 113 (1957).
31. SAMUEL L. POPKIN, THE REASONING VOTER: COMMUNICATION AND
PERSUASION IN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS 50–60 (2d ed. 1994). It is worth noting that Popkin’s argument does not work as well in non-partisan contests. As
McDermott shows, however, other cues available on the ballot can sometimes
be valuable to voters’ decisions. Monika L. McDermott, Candidate Occupations
and Voter Information Shortcuts, 67 J. POL. 201 (2005) (occupation of candidate); Monika L. McDermott, Race and Gender Cues in Low-Information Elections, 51 POL. RES. Q. 895 (1998) (race and gender of candidate); McDermott,
supra note 15 (candidate gender).
32. See Elizabeth Garrett & Mathew D. McCubbins, When Voters Make
Laws: How Direct Democracy is Shaping American Cities, 4 PUB. WORKS
MGMT. & POL’Y 39, 50 (2008); Garrett & Smith, supra note 1, at 298.
33. Garrett & Smith, supra note 1, at 306.

1566

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[97:1557

endorsement at the point of decision. Accordingly, we expect
that usage of endorsements in direct democracy will be far
more limited when compared with prominent candidate contests where some 80% or more of voters vote in accordance with
34
their party preference.
As noted above, however, the conventional wisdom in the
academic literature stems from Lupia’s single study finding
that voters use endorsements to make reasoned choices. Over
Lupia’s own objections, scholars have cited his research to assume away the salient problem of poor voter knowledge not only in direct democracy but also in most electoral contests.
Lupia’s results, to be sure, are compelling and normatively appealing. In his examination of voters in Los Angeles, he discovers that respondents who know that Ralph Nader endorsed one
of the measures are just as likely to support the initiative when
35
compared with voters who have a deeper level of knowledge.
Similarly, he finds that voters who know that trial lawyers’
groups and insurance companies support the other measures
are as likely to vote against the initiatives when compared with
36
voters who know substantially more. In a related study, Karp
finds that endorsements are conditional on whether the individual has a positive or negative perception of the cue-giver
37
(e.g., the mechanism that establishes trust with the voter).
Taken together, these two studies paint a relatively optimistic
picture of the uninformed and under-informed voter.
More recent empirical evidence, however, challenges the
notion that voters’ use of endorsement in elections is widespread. Burnett, Garrett, and McCubbins show that, after accounting for policy preferences, voters who know an endorsement cast votes that are indistinguishable from voters who
38
have no knowledge about the measure. Additionally, in three
34. GARY C. JACOBSON, THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 119
(7th ed., 2009).
35. Lupia, supra note 4, at 69–72.
36. Id.
37. Jeffrey A. Karp, The Influence of Elite Endorsements in Initiative
Campaigns, in CITIZENS AS LEGISLATORS: DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED
STATES 149, 161 (Shaun Bowler et al. eds., 1998).
38. Burnett, Garrett & McCubbins, supra note 16, at 317; see also Craig
M. Burnett & Mathew D. McCubbins, Sex and the Ballot Box: Perception of
Ballot Measures Regarding Same-Sex Marriage and Abortion in California
24–27 (July 17, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1884579.
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survey experiments, Burnett and Parry find that a gubernato39
rial endorsement was effective for just one measure. These
studies and our own here stand in direct opposition to Lupia’s
40
findings.
II. TESTING THE EFFICACY OF ENDORSEMENTS IN
DIRECT DEMOCRACY
Overall, the empirical evidence concerning individuals’ use
of endorsements to evaluate ballot measure is mixed. Here, we
significantly add to the existing data and analysis of whether
endorsements are effective in direct democracy. In what follows, we test the general hypothesis that individuals use endorsements to inform their choices on ballot measures. Similar
to Karp, we expect that the persuasiveness of an endorsement
will be conditional on the individual’s perception of the cue41
giver. For individuals who hold a positive view of the cuegiver, our expectation is that they will vote in accordance with
the cue-giver’s endorsement. Conversely, individuals who hold
a negative assessment of the cue-giver will be more likely to
vote against the interests of the cue-giver, effectively using the
endorsement to do the opposite. More formally, our two hypotheses are:
H1: Individuals who are aware of a cue-giver’s endorsement and have
a positive view of the cue-giver will use that information to vote in accordance with the cue-giver’s endorsement.
H2: Individuals who are aware of a cue-giver’s endorsement and have
a negative view of the cue-giver will use that information to vote in
opposition to the cue-giver’s endorsement.

39. Craig M. Burnett & Janine Parry, Gubernatorial Endorsements and
Ballot Measure Approval (Aug. 21, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2144966.
40. It is worth noting that all studies are limited in their ability to assess
how often individuals use endorsements. No study can hope to evaluate every
endorsement that is available. As a result, these studies evaluate a subset of
the available endorsements and find that among the most prominent endorsements available to the broadest number of individuals, usage of endorsements is limited.
41. Karp, supra note 37, at 161 (describing how a voter would respond to
Tom Foley based on that voter’s perception of him).
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A. DATA
We use data from two surveys collected before the 2012
presidential primaries in North Carolina (May 8) and California (June 5) to test our hypotheses. In our surveys, we asked
respondents to report their knowledge of endorsements on
three contentious ballot measures. For the first survey, we targeted voting-eligible residents of North Carolina from April 27,
2012, to May 3, 2012 (primaries were on May 8, 2012). We contracted our sampling needs to Marketing Systems Group
(MSG). MSG recruited an online sample of North Carolina residents and directed the survey respondents to our survey hosted by Survey Gizmo. Overall, we collected a sample of 1066 re42
spondents over the week that our survey was in the field. The
response rate for this survey was 6%.
On this survey, we asked potential voters about North
Carolina’s Amendment 1, a legislatively referred constitutional
amendment that would define marriage to be between one man
43
and one woman. While North Carolina law already prohibited

42. Non-probability samples are the subject of some debate in the survey
research literature. Compare Stephen Ansolabehere & Brian F. Schaffner,
Does Survey Mode Still Matter? Findings from a 2010 Multi-Mode Comparison
23–24 (June 13, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1868229 (concluding that on-line opt-in
surveys are as accurate as telephone and mailing surveys), with Neil Malhotra
& Jon A. Krosnick, The Effect of Survey Mode and Sampling on Inferences
About Political Attitudes and Behavior: Comparing the 2000 and 2004 ANES
to Internet Surveys with Nonprobability Samples, 15 POL. ANALYSIS 286, 312
(2007) (stating that results may differ considerably based on the survey method used and whether a probability or non-probability sample was used), and
David S. Yeager et al., Comparing the Accuracy of RDD Telephone Surveys
and Internet Surveys Conducted with Probability and Non-Probability Samples, 75 PUB. OPINION Q. 709, 731–32 (2011) (arguing that probability surveys—either telephone or internet—are much more accurate than nonprobability surveys). The non-probability online sampling technique is similar
to the methods that large political science surveys use (such as
Polimetrix/YouGov and Knowledge Networks). Unlike these studies, however,
our sample was not recruited for the specific purpose of completing a political
survey. Instead, our sample consists of voting eligible adults in North Carolina
and registered voters in California. While online samples are usually more politically knowledgeable and interested in politics, this should bias our sample
toward finding that our respondents knew the endorsements more often than
the average voter. While our samples are convenience samples and not representative, our samples match important demographic statistics for both states.
For a comparison of our samples to relevant census statistics, see the online
appendix located at http://mccubbins.us.
43. Maxine Eichner et al., Potential Legal Impact of the Proposed Same-
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same-sex marriage, the Republican-controlled legislature
sought to remove any legal questions surrounding the policy,
including whether the state would have to recognize out-of44
state same-sex marriages. Some legislators felt the question
was important enough that voters were the only suitable entity
to decide the matter (voters must approve all constitutional
45
amendments in North Carolina ). Two prominent politicians
took public positions on the amendment: President Barack
46
Obama opposed the amendment (he would later come out in
favor of same-sex marriage outright) and Governor Beverly
Perdue, a Democrat, also opposed the measure (though she has
47
stated that she is not in favor of same-sex marriage). As both
are prominent political figures within the state, they satisfy the
trustworthy condition (individuals can establish a common—or
opposition—interest) and knowledgeability condition (both are
policy experts) necessary for persuasion. To gauge whether our
respondents were aware of their positions, we asked the following questions:
(1) Do you happen to know if President Barack Obama supported, opposed, or took no position on Amendment 1? (The correct answer is
“opposed”)
(2) Do you happen to know if Governor Beverly Perdue supported, opposed, or took no position on Amendment 1? (The correct answer is
“opposed”)

Our second survey targeted registered voters in California
just before the 2012 presidential primary on June 5, 2012. The
process was identical to our North Carolina survey, we contracted the sampling to MSG, which sent respondents to our
survey hosted on Survey Gizmo. We started our survey collection efforts about a week before the election (May 30, 2012) and
ended just before Election Day (June 4, 2012). In all, we gathered surveys from 1165 registered California voters.
Sex Marriage Amendment to the North Carolina Constitution, ACLU OF N.
CAROLINA 1 (June 6, 2011), available at http://www.acluofnc.org/files/Final%
20Marriage%20Amendment%20Report%202.pdf.
44. Id. at 4.
45. N.C. CONST. art II, § 22, cl. 2.
46. Rob Christensen & Tim Funk, Obama Opposes N.C. Marriage
Amendment Proposal, NEWS & OBSERVER, Mar. 16, 2012, http://www
.newsobserver.com/2012/03/16/1936718/obama-opposes-amendmentone.html#storylink=misearch.
47. Craig Jarvis, Perdue Opposes Marriage Amendment, NEWS & OBSERVER, Oct. 8, 2011, http://www.newsobserver.com/2011/10/08/1548617/
perdue-opposes-marriage-amendment.html#storylink=misearch.

1570

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[97:1557

We asked respondents on this survey about Propositions 28
and 29. Proposition 28—which was strikingly similar in construction to California’s Proposition 93 that failed in 2008—was
an initiative that proposed to modify California’s constitution to
lengthen the amount of time a legislator could serve in a single
48
house of the California State Legislature. The measure proposed that a legislator could serve up to twelve years in either
49
the Senate or Assembly. Existing law permitted legislators to
serve six years in the Assembly and eight years in the Senate, a
50
total of fourteen years for lawmakers elected to both houses.
Thus, the measure would reduce the total number of years an
elected representative could serve in the legislature from four51
teen to twelve. In effect, Proposition 28 aimed to allow legislators to serve all of their years in a single house, an outcome
proponents argued would strike a balance between the legislature’s need for stability and expertise while preserving the
goals of term limits (e.g., turnover in office and better representation).
A number of prominent groups in California took a stance
on Proposition 28. The California Republican Party voted to
oppose the measure publicly as a part of the party’s official po52
sitions. California Common Cause and the League of Women
Voters of California each supported the legislation, promoted
its passage, and signed the official ballot pamphlet’s argument
53
in support of the measure. While the California Republican
54
Party meets the two conditions for persuasion, the other two
interest groups mentioned will be persuasive for a subset of the
population. Common Cause often takes public positions on ballot measures and policy outcomes (for example, Common Cause

48. California Ballot Propositions, CALIFORNIA CHOICES (June 5, 2012),
http://californiachoices.org/ballot-measures/proposition-28.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. (reducing the total number of years an elected official could serve
by two years).
52. Sue Caro, Proposition 28: Our Party Urges a “NO” Vote on This Deceptive Initiative, PIEDMONTPATCH (June 2, 2012, 2:44 AM), http://piedmont
.patch.com/blog_posts/proposition-28-our-party-urges-a-no-vote-on-this
-deceptive-initiative.
53. Prop 28: Should We Change the California Legislature’s Term Limits?,
S. CAL. PUB. RADIO (May 29, 2012), http://www.scpr.org/programs/airtalk/
2012/05/29/26672/prop-28-seeks-to-change-california-legislatures-te/.
54. See supra text accompanying notes 24–25.
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engineered the approval of a non-partisan redistricting commission in California), but only some individuals will share
common interests with the group. The League of Women Voters, a group that often promotes the spread of election information, is a knowledgeable source of policy outcomes (they
write independent summaries of how ballot measures will affect the state before each election) but, again, not every voter
will share a common interest with the group. We asked three
questions to estimate whether our respondents were aware of
these endorsements:
(3) Do you happen to know if the California Republican Party supported, opposed, or took no position on Proposition 28? (The correct
answer is “opposed”)
(4) Do you happen to know if California Common Cause supported,
opposed, or took no position on Proposition 28? (The correct answer is
“supported”)
(5) Do you happen to know if the League of Women Voters of California supported, opposed, or took no position on Proposition 28? (The
correct answer is “supported”)

We also asked voters about Proposition 29, a statutory initiative that proposed an additional $1 excise tax on tobacco
55
products. Proposition 29 promised to raise California’s excise
tax on a pack of cigarettes from $0.87 to $1.87, which would
have increased taxes collected on tobacco products by about
56
$860 million per year. The lion’s share of the revenues raised
by the additional tax would go toward general cancer research,
research on tobacco-related diseases, and public education and
57
tobacco abatement projects.
Similar to Proposition 28, a number of prominent organizations took a public position on Proposition 29. RJ Reynolds, the
tobacco conglomerate, opposed the measure, contributing over
$11 million to defeat it (a number bested only by fellow tobacco
58
conglomerate Altria/Philip Morris). Some individuals will find
55. Elizabeth Hartfield, California Proposition 29 to Raise Tax on Cigarettes Has Voters Divided, ABC NEWS (June 6, 2012, 4:37 AM), http://abcnews
.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/06/california-split-on-proposition-29-to-raise-tax-on
-cigarettes/.
56. Phil Willon, Vote Remains Close on Prop. 29 Tobacco Tax Ballot Initiative, L.A. TIMES (June 19, 2012, 1:01 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/
california-politics/2012/06/vote-remains-right-on-tobacco-tax-ballot
-initiative.html.
57. Id.
58. Cigarette Showdown as Californians Vote on Tax, CNN (June 5, 2012,
11:59 AM) [hereinafter Cigarette Showdown], http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/05/
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RJ Reynolds persuasive because the company’s position against
raising taxes on tobacco products is well known. Many individuals have strong feelings about tobacco companies and thus
know whether they should accept or reject RJ Reynolds’s opposition to the measure. The American Heart Association (AHA)
supported Proposition 29’s passage, explaining that the additional funds would help researchers reduce the number of to59
bacco related deaths. Over the years, the AHA has become one
of the definitive sources for compiling and analyzing research
on tobacco and heart disease, making the AHA a knowledgeable source of information. Many individuals share a common interest with the AHA, as their stance on tobacco use (and the
benefits of tobacco taxation) is well known and long-standing.
The AHA donated over $500,000 to support the measure’s pas60
sage. The California Republican Party opposed the measure,
making its position known by officially adopting an adversarial
61
stance to the initiative. As above, the California Republican
Party easily meets the conditions necessary for persuasion. The
Lance Armstrong Foundation supported the measure, making a
62
large $1.5 million donation. The Lance Armstrong Foundation
has a long history of supporting cancer research and promoting
an active and healthy lifestyle. While some voters will share
common interests with the foundation and will perceive the
foundation to be knowledgeable, some voters will not. Such a
large and public donation (i.e., a costly signal), however, satisfies the necessary conditions for persuasion. Finally, Grover
Norquist and his interest group Americans for Tax Reform op63
posed the measure. A prominent political figure and interest
group, many voters are likely to share common interests with
Norquist. Additionally, Norquist is a tax policy expert, most
famously known for his ability to gather pledges from legislaus/california-cigarette-tax.
59. Id.
60. Stephen Stock et al., The Investigative Unit Follows Prop 29 Money
Trail, NBC BAY AREA (June 4, 2012, 6:32 AM), http://www.nbcbayarea.com/
investigations/The-Investigative-Unit-Follows-Prop-29-Money-Trail
--156450895.html.
61. California Ballot Propositions, CALIFORNIA CHOICES (June 5, 2012),
http://californiachoices.org/ballot-measures/proposition-29.
62. Cigarette Showdown, supra note 58.
63. Dan Morain, Op-Ed, Big Tobacco Fires Up Anti-Tax Effort, THE
SACRAMENTO BEE (Apr. 15, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.sacbee.com/2012/04/
15/4413061/big-tobacco-fires-up-anti-tax.html.
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tors to never raise taxes. To assess whether voters were aware
of these endorsements, we asked the following questions:
(6) Do you happen to know if RJ Reynolds supported, opposed, or took
no position on Proposition 29? (The correct answer is “opposed”)
(7) Do you happen to know if the American Heart Association supported, opposed, or took no position on Proposition 29? (The correct
answer is “supported”)
(8) Do you happen to know if the California Republican Party supported, opposed, or took no position on Proposition 29? (The correct
answer is “opposed”)
(9) Do you happen to know if the Lance Armstrong Foundation supported, opposed, or took no position on Proposition 29? (The correct
answer is “supported”)
(10) Do you happen to know if Americans for Tax Reform supported,
opposed, or took no position on Proposition 29? (The correct answer is
“opposed”)

In addition to the questions we use to measure knowledge
of endorsements, we also asked our respondents one factual
knowledge question for each of the ballot measures. We use
these questions to assess whether respondents could recall details about each ballot measure. In the words of Lupia, these
questions assess whether respondents have “encyclopedic
64
knowledge.” For Amendment 1 on the 2012 North Carolina
presidential primary survey, we asked voters whether they understood that North Carolina already prohibited same-sex marriage. As we note earlier, Amendment 1 did not propose to
65
change the status quo. Instead, the state legislature proposed
the referendum so that the existing law would become a permanent amendment to the state’s constitution. To assess
whether voters understood this fact, we asked:
(11) To the best of your knowledge, do you know if North Carolina law
currently prohibits same-sex marriage? (The correct answer is “Yes,
state law prohibits same-sex marriage”)

For Proposition 28 on the 2012 California presidential primary survey, we asked whether voters understood that California had already enacted term limits. Proposition 28 proposed
to alter the existing term limit laws, not remove them or enact
66
term limits where none existed. Thus, the question we asked

64. Lupia, supra note 4, at 63.
65. See Eichner et al., supra note 43, at 4 (arguing that the sponsor’s goal
was to put the statutory prohibition in the Constitution but that the actual
impact could be much greater).
66. California Ballot Propositions, supra note 48.
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of our respondents gauges whether they understood the status
quo policy in California regarding limits on how long elected
representatives are allowed to serve in the state legislature.
(12) Do you happen to know if state legislators in California are subject to term limits—that is, a maximum amount of time they can
serve in the state legislature? (The correct answer is a “Yes, state legislators are subject to term limits”)

Our final factual knowledge question concerns Proposition
29 on the 2012 California presidential primary survey. Similar
to the previous two questions, we wanted to measure whether
our respondents knew the status quo of the policy in question.
Proposition 29 proposed to increase the existing excise tax on
67
tobacco products. Accordingly, we asked our respondents to
report their knowledge concerning the existence of an excise
tax on tobacco products.
(13) Do you happen to know if California currently collects an excise
tax on tobacco purchases, above and beyond the regular sales tax on
goods? (The correct answer is a “Yes, California currently has an excise tax on tobacco products”)

We asked these factual knowledge questions to measure
the relative depth of knowledge that our respondents possessed
regarding the ballot measures on our surveys. These questions
allow us to estimate whether respondents who knew a fact report a vote choice that is different when compared with respondents who had knowledge of an endorsement or no
knowledge of either an endorsement or a fact.
B. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS
To evaluate our hypotheses, we employ a post-test-only
non-equivalent group design. Our design estimates the effect of
information—that is, knowledge of an endorsement and
knowledge of facts—on vote choice. Identical to Lupia, our
68
treatment is knowledge of an endorsement. Unlike Lupia,
however, we cannot assume to know our respondents’ preferences with regards to their evaluations of the relevant cue givers (Lupia’s model assumes a near-universal dislike of both
lawyers and insurance companies and, conversely, a near-

67. Hartfield, supra note 55.
68. See Lupia, supra note 4, at 68 (describing that one of the variables potential voters used in making their decision was “knowledge of an informationprovider’s preferences”).
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unanimous trust in a Ralph-Nader-led consumer group ). Instead, we argue that our respondents’ use of endorsements to
arrive at a decision will be conditional on their evaluation of
70
the cue-giver, as Lupia and McCubbins demonstrate. To account for this conditional use of endorsements, we divide our
respondents into multiple subgroups. As an example, consider
President Obama’s opposition to North Carolina’s same-sex
marriage ban (Amendment 1). For this endorsement, we separate our respondents into two groups: one group composed of
respondents who approve of the president’s job performance,
and a second group that contains only respondents who disapprove of the president’s job performance. For the first group
that contains respondents who approve of the president’s performance, we expect that the treated respondents—those respondents who were aware of his opposition to the measure—
will be more likely to oppose the measure when compared with
respondents who did not receive the treatment. For the second
group that contains only respondents who disapprove of the
president, treated respondents will be more likely to vote in favor of the amendment when compared with untreated respondents—in effect, the treated respondents in this group will be
more likely to do the opposite of what the president suggests.
To implement this design feature, we ask our respondents
to assess the cue-givers. For President Obama and Governor
Perdue we asked respondents about how they perceived the
president’s and governor’s job performance. For the remainder
of the endorsements—composed largely of interest groups, political parties, and corporations—we queried respondents about
how they perceived the group. Similar to a feeling thermometer, we asked respondents to indicate whether they had a positive, negative, or neutral perception of the entire group. For
these endorsements, we separate our respondents into two
groups: one composed of respondents with a positive view of the
cue-giver, and a second that contains respondents who hold a
negative view of the cue-giver (we have no prediction for neutral respondents).
By splitting our sample into subgroups based on our respondents’ assessment of the cue-giver, we avoid making the

69. Id. at 72.
70. See DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA, supra note 15, at 68 (arguing that “persuasion requires a perception of knowledge and a basis for trust”).
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assumption that the propensity to know the endorsement is
equally distributed between two groups. If we handle our sample as if the distribution of propensity scores are identical between the groups, we would be assuming that certain subsets of
individuals are more (or less) likely to learn specific endorsements compared with other types of individuals, which is unrealistic.
While splitting the sample into subgroups controls for the
difference in propensity scores between groups, we must also
account for within group propensity score imbalances to
achieve a true quasi-experimental test. To that end, we match
respondents who received our treatment (knowledge of a cue)
with respondents who did not receive our treatment (no
knowledge of a cue) on common demographic variables (age, income, education, party identification, ideology, gender, political
71
knowledge, and state level political knowledge). To implement
72
our matching equation, we use the GenMatch package for R
73
as implemented by MatchIt to create the best matches between our treatment and control groups based on our matching
equation.
What does matching provide us that a simple regression
without matching cannot? Matching, in essence, ensures that
we achieve excellent covariate balance between the treatment
(knew an endorsement) and control (no knowledge of an endorsement) groups. As a result, we can be confident that any
findings we uncover in our analysis are not the result of a covariate imbalance between our treatment and control groups.
After we match respondents in the treatment and control
groups using GenMatch, we run a series of logit regressions to
estimate whether our treatment has an effect on vote choice.
Formally, the structure of the logit regression equation is

71. Only Propositions 28 and 29 include state level political knowledge as
a covariate in the matching algorithm. We did not include measures of state
level political knowledge on the other surveys.
72. Alexis Diamond & Jasjeet Sekhon, Genetic Matching for Estimating
Causal Effects: A General Multivariate Matching Method of Achieving Balance
in Observational Studies, REV. ECON & STAT (forthcoming) (manuscript at 2),
available at http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/REST_a_00318.
73. See Daniel Ho et al., Matching as Nonparametric Preprocessing for
Reducing Model Dependence in Parametric Causal Inference, 15 POL. ANALYSIS 199, 202 (2007) (stating that MatchIt is “available as an open source and
free R package”).
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(1)

In Equation (1), Pr(yiz = 1) is a respondent’s estimated
probability of supporting a ballot measure, where i identifies a
specific respondent and z denotes a specific ballot measure.
Since this is a binary choice, a “1” indicates a “yes” vote and “0”
represents a “no” vote on proposition z. In the equation, Q is a
matrix of dichotomous variables that indicate whether respondent i was aware of one of the endorsements related to ballot measure z. The number of variables contained in matrix Q
varies from three (Amendment 1 of 2012) to five (Proposition 29
of 2012). The final term, denoted by X, is a matrix of covariates.
This matrix of covariates differs for each ballot measure. For all
ballot measures, X includes dichotomous variables identifying
whether respondent i is a Liberal, a Conservative, and whether
she was aware of the fact or facts relating to proposition z; it also contains standard measures of Age, Education, Income, and
74
Political Knowledge. For Amendment 1 of North Carolina
75
(2012), X includes measures of Party Identification. Finally,
for Propositions 28 and 29, X includes a measure of State Level
76
Political Knowledge. Equation (1), then, allows us to test
74. Political Knowledge for Amendment 1 (NC, 2012) is the percentage of
correct answers to the following questions:
(1) Whose responsibility is it to determine if a law is constitutional or
not?
(2) Do you happen to know what job or office Harry Reid currently
holds?
(3) How much of a majority of both the House of Representatives and
the Senate are required to override a presidential veto?
(4) Do you happen to know which party has the most members in the
House of Representatives in Washington, DC?
(5) Who is the current Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives?
(6) Who is the current Chief Justice of the United States Supreme
Court?
For Propositions 28 and 29 (CA, 2012), the variable is similar to Amendment 1
(NC, 2012) except that it includes one additional question: Do you happen to
know which party has the most members in the Senate in Washington, DC?
75. Including Party Identification with Propositions 28 and 29 created
collinearity problems with ideology.
76. State Level Political Knowledge for Propositions 28 and 29 is the percentage of correct responses to the following questions:
(1) Do you happen to know who is the current Speaker of the California Assembly?
(2) Do you happen to know who is the current Secretary of State of
California?
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whether knowing an endorsement had an effect on our respondents independent of our control variables. Figure 1 below
summarizes our research design.
Figure 1
Summary of Research Design
Positive Assessment of
Cue-Giver

Genetic Matching

Regression Analysis of
Endorsement Effects

Negative Assessment of
Cue-Giver

Genetic Matching

Regression Analysis of
Endorsement Effects

Full Sample

C. RESULTS
We present our results in two steps. First, we report summary statistics of how much our respondents knew about each
ballot measure. That is, we tabulate the percentage of correct
responses to our endorsement and factual-knowledge questions.
Second, we present our regression results with our matched
samples for each ballot measure. To provide context to these
regressions, we calculate and present the marginal effect that
knowledge of the cues had on vote choice for each measure.
We begin our analysis by presenting the percentage of correct answers to the endorsement and factual-knowledge questions we asked for all ballot measures. These data, shown in
Table 1 below, represent the largest collection of survey responses concerning how much voters know about ballot
measures assembled to date. Table 1 presents a number of interesting findings. With regards to Amendment 1 of North Carolina (2012), our respondents’ knowledge of the measure’s endorsements was quite poor, but knowledge of the policy status
quo was widespread. For Proposition 28 (2012), knowledge of
the three endorsements was limited; again, however,
(3) Do you happen to know who is the current Lieutenant Governor of
California?
(4) Do you happen to know which party has the most members in the
California Assembly?
(5) Do you happen to know which party has the most members in the
California Senate?
(6) Do you happen to know who is the current President Pro Tempore
of the California Senate?
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knowledge of the policy status quo was common. Finally,
knowledge of the endorsements pertaining to Proposition 29
(2012) was mixed: three of the endorsements were not well
known, but a majority of our respondents knew the endorsements from the American Heart Association and the Lance
Armstrong Foundation. As was the case with Amendment 1
and Proposition 28, knowledge of the policy status quo concerning Proposition 29 was well known. Overall, then, the results in
Table 1 lead to two general conclusions about our data. First,
knowledge of endorsements varies substantially across and
77
within ballot measures. Second, knowledge of a policy’s status
quo is also strikingly widespread. In fact, our respondents were
able to identify the status quo policy correctly 64% to 71% of
the time.

77. It is possible, of course, that some respondents could simply infer the
positions of these groups (equating to an educated guess). These results, however, largely conform to what we have found in previous research, especially
with regards to knowledge of the governor’s endorsement. See Burnett & Parry, supra note 39.
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Table 1
Percentage of Correct Responses to Endorsement
and Factual Knowledge Questions
Question Description

Ballot Measure

% Correct

President Obama Opposed (Cue)

Amendment 1 (NC, 2012)

40

Governor Beverly Perdue Opposed (Cue)

Amendment 1 (NC, 2012)

42.4

NC Prohibits Same-Sex Marriage Already
(Fact)

Amendment 1 (NC, 2012)

70.2

CA Republican Party Opposed (Cue)

Proposition 28 (CA, 2012)

32.8

CA Common Cause Supported (Cue)

Proposition 28 (CA, 2012)

32.6

CA League of Women Voters Supported (Cue)

Proposition 28 (CA, 2012)

39.3

California has Term Limits in Place (Fact)

Proposition 28 (CA, 2012)

64.2

RJ Reynolds Opposed (Cue)

Proposition 29 (CA, 2012)

43.5

American Heart Association Supported (Cue)

Proposition 29 (CA, 2012)

66

CA Republican Party Opposed (Cue)

Proposition 29 (CA, 2012)

24.1

Lance Armstrong Foundation Supported (Cue)

Proposition 29 (CA, 2012)

55.5

Americans for Tax Reform Opposed (Cue)

Proposition 29 (CA, 2012)

20.3

CA has Excise Tax on Tobacco Already (Fact)

Proposition 29 (CA, 2012)

71

Note: We calculate the percentage of correct responses to these questions based on the respondents who are eligible for regression analysis after matching. The sample sizes are as follows: Amendment 1
(NC, 2012) N=778; Proposition 28 (CA, 2012) N=684; Proposition 29
(CA, 2012) N=1012.

Before running our regressions, we implemented genetic
matching. By matching on exogenous covariates, we aim to improve the comparability of our treatment (knew an endorsement) and control (did not know an endorsement) groups for
each of the three ballot measures. While we do not present here
all of the details for our matching results due to their length, a
full description of the covariate and propensity score improve78
ments is available in an online appendix. To provide a snapshot of how well our matching algorithm worked, we present
the improvement in distance—that is, the propensity to receive
the treatment—for the treatment and control groups for each
78. The online appendix can be found at http://mccubbins.us.
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subgroup we examine below. As Table 2 shows, the distribution
of propensity scores between treatment and control groups improves substantially for each treatment condition. Table 2, in
conjunction with our online appendix, demonstrates that the
matching process helps our ability to produce comparable
groups.
Table 2
Improvement in Mean Propensity Scores with
Genetic Matching
Matched Treatment Condition

Mean Propensity
Difference Pre

Mean Propensity
Difference Post

Percent Improvement

NC Amendment 1, Approve
Obama

0.079

0.003

95.8

NC Amendment 1, Disapprove
Obama

0.064

0.004

94.5

NC Amendment 1, Approve Perdue

0.077

0.003

95.5

NC Amendment 1, Disapprove
Perdue

0.077

0.002

97.0

CA Prop. 28, Positive Republicans

0.095

0.010

89.9

CA Prop. 28, Negative Republicans

0.082

0.006

92.6

CA Prop. 28, Positive Common
Cause

0.091

0.000

99.6

CA Prop. 28, Positive LWV

0.099

0.003

96.7

CA Prop. 29, Positive Republicans

0.110

0.006

94.5

CA Prop. 29, Negative Republicans

0.104

0.004

96.1

CA Prop. 29, Positive AHA

0.084

0.004

94.7

CA Prop. 29, Positive Lance
Armstrong

0.040

0.006

84.4

CA Prop. 29, Negative Lance
Armstrong

0.183

0.028

84.7

CA Prop. 29, Negative Tobacco

0.248

0.017

93.1

CA Prop. 29, Positive Americans
for Tax Reform

0.126

0.010

92.3
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We turn now to present the logit regression results based
on Equation (1) for each measure. We also calculate the probability of voting in favor of each measure by varying our respondents’ knowledge of endorsements. We begin by analyzing
the regression results for North Carolina’s Amendment 1
(2012) that proposed to modify the state’s constitution to outlaw same-sex marriage. As Table 3 shows, our respondents’ use
of endorsements is not universal. For respondents who approved of Obama’s job performance (Model 1), respondents who
were aware of his opposition to the measure were significantly
less likely to vote for the amendment. For respondents who disapproved of Obama (Model 2), knowing Obama’s opposition led
to significantly more support for the amendment. By contrast,
respondents who both approved (Model 3) and disapproved
(Model 4) of the governor’s job performance were unlikely to
use her endorsement to arrive a decision. For these two models,
ideology and partisanship appear to be more important predictors of vote choice. Notably, respondents’ knowledge of the fact
we asked about concerning the referendum’s status quo had no
discernible effect on vote choice. For all four models, knowing a
homosexual personally had a strong and negative effect on our
respondents’ apparent support for the initiative.
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Table 3
Logit Results for Vote on North Carolina’s Same-Sex
Marriage Amendment (Amendment 1, 2012)

Cue: Obama Opposed
Cue: Perdue Opposed
Fact: NC Prohibits
SSM
Democrat
Republican
Conservative
Liberal
Age
Income
Education
Knows Homosexual
Political Knowledge
Constant
2

Pseudo-R
N

Model (1)
Approve
Obama
-1.31**
(0.43)
—
—
0.11

Model (2)
Disapprove
Obama
0.75*
(0.33)
—
—
-0.29

Model (3)
Approve Perdue
—
—
0.06
(0.28)
0.37

Model (4)
Disapprove
Perdue
—
—
0.07
(0.27)
0.37

(0.51)
0.15
(0.54)
-0.60
(1.06)
0.78
(0.90)
-1.75**
(0.46)
0.02
(0.01)
-0.08
(0.17)
-0.18
(0.20)
-1.77**
(0.48)
-0.98
(0.76)
2.43*
(1.17)
.237
175

(0.37)
1.07
(0.91)
0.71*
(0.33)
1.48**
(0.35)
-0.11
(0.50)
0.02
(0.01)
-0.22
(0.13)
0.15
(0.14)
-0.86*
(0.37)
-0.47
(0.49)
-1.08
(0.74)
.221
286

(0.31)
-0.02
(0.36)
0.73*
(0.33)
0.97**
(0.31)
-1.56**
(0.39)
0.01
(0.01)
-0.08
(0.09)
0.00
(0.11)
-1.17**
(0.32)
-0.24
(0.42)
0.14
(0.71)
.268
393

(0.28)
0.00
(0.34)
0.15
(0.32)
1.05**
(0.31)
-1.66**
(0.36)
0.02*
(0.01)
-0.15
(0.09)
0.16
(0.11)
-0.99**
(0.33)
-0.84*
(0.42)
-0.15
(0.69)
.235
412

Note: Dependent variable is respondent’s self-reported intention of
voting in favor or against North Carolina’s Amendment 1 that proposed to modify the state’s constitution to outlaw same-sex marriage.
Excluded group: independents who were unaware of the endorsement or fact.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01

To provide context to these results, we calculate the probability of voting in favor of Amendment 1 by using SPost for
79
Stata. We estimate these probabilities by varying knowledge

79. See J. SCOTT LONG & JEREMY FREESE, REGRESSION MODELS FOR CAT-
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of Obama’s and Perdue’s position and holding all other variables at their mean value. As Figure 2 shows, knowledge of President Obama’s endorsement has a substantial effect on vote
choice for both individuals who approve (21% decrease in the
probability of voting in favor of the measure) and disapprove
(17% increase) of his job performance; both effects are in the
expected direction. Governor Perdue’s endorsement, however,
was not significant. Taken together, Table 2 and Figure 2 provide mixed support for our hypotheses: if you can get the president to endorse a policy on the ballot, it may have a substantial
effect on the vote (notice, however, that it is a two-edged-sword
in that the cut is positive for the president’s supporters and
negative for his opponents).
Figure 2
Probability of Voting in Favor of North Carolina
Same-Sex Marriage Amendment (Amendment 1, 2012)
100%
90%
80%
70.4%

70%
60%

53.0%

50%

52.1%

52.5%

50.6%

50.7%

40%
35.3%
30%
20%
12.9%

10%
0%
Cue

No Cue

Approve Obama

Cue

No Cue

Disapprove Obama

Cue

No Cue

Approve Perdue

EGORICAL DEPENDENT VARIABLES USING STATA

(2d ed. 2006).

Cue

No Cue

Disapprove Perdue
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We turn now to present the regression results for Califor80
nia’s Proposition 28 (2012) in Table 4. Similar to the previous
ballot measure, the endorsements we asked about had a mixed
effect on our respondents. In particular, respondents who had a
positive view of the California Republican Party and knew that
the party opposed the measure were less likely to support the
initiative; respondents who had a negative assessment of the
Republican Party, however, were unaffected by their endorsement. Similarly, respondents who were aware that Common
Cause supported the proposition and had a positive view of the
group did not seem to use that endorsement to arrive at a decision. Finally, knowing that the California League of Women
Voters supported the measure had no effect on respondents
who held a positive view of the group. It is also worth noting
that knowledge of the key facts regarding Proposition 28 had
no effect on vote choice. When we plot the predicted probabilities of support for Proposition 28 in Figure 3, it becomes clear
that only one endorsement for one subgroup—respondents who
knew the California Republican Party’s opposition and had a
positive view of the party—has a large substantive effect on
vote choice. The other regressions find no support for our hypotheses. As such, the results for Proposition 28 provide mini81
mal support for our expectations.

80. Unfortunately, there were not enough respondents who had a negative
impression of Common Cause or the League of Women Voters to analyze the
effect of their endorsements on those subgroups.
81. It is possible that some endorsements are more useful than others. For
Proposition 28, only the California Republican Party’s endorsement had a significant effect on vote choice. While one endorsement may be effective enough
to improve the decisions of everyone, our results suggest this is not the case:
the majority of voters do not find even this potentially powerful endorsement
persuasive (or, they report not being aware of it altogether).
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Table 4
Logit Results for California’s Term Limits Amendment (Proposition 28, 2012)
Model (1)
Positive
CA Republicans

Model (2)
Negative CA Republicans

Model (3)
Positive Common
Cause

Model (4)
Positive
CA LWV

-1.90**

-0.01

—

—

(0.72)

(0.40)

—

—

Cue: Common
Cause Supported

—

—

0.95

—

—

—

(0.65)

—

Cue: LWV Supported

—

—

—

0.07

—

—

—

(0.37)

-1.16

-0.05

1.24

0.44

(0.80)

(0.36)

(0.84)

(0.37)

-0.89

0.60

0.08

0.80

(0.66)

(0.84)

(1.02)

(0.59)

0.28

0.24

-0.32

0.83*

(1.48)

(0.39)

(0.76)

(0.42)

-0.03

-0.00

-0.04

-0.01

(0.03)

(0.01)

(0.02)

(0.01)

-0.05

0.14

-0.33

0.18

(0.18)

(0.16)

(0.27)

(0.13)

0.21

0.16

0.50

0.04

(0.30)

(0.19)

(0.30)

(0.17)

-1.11

-0.65

-0.69

-0.25

(1.25)

(0.79)

(1.06)

(0.83)

-1.80

0.04

1.78

0.05

(1.22)

(0.63)

(1.31)

(0.73)

Cue: Republicans
Opposed

Fact: CA has
Term Limits
Conservative

Liberal

Age

Income

Education

Political
Knowledge
CA Political
Knowledge
Constant

5.41

0.82

1.30

0.76

Pseudo-R2
N

(2.04)
.308
70

(0.97)
.020
218

(1.68)
.152
126

(0.89)
.055
266

Note: Dependent variable is respondent’s self-reported intention of voting
in favor or against California’s Proposition 28 that proposed to modify the
state’s constitution to restructure the term limit rules for California’s
elected officials. Excluded group: independents who were unaware of any
of the endorsements or fact. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01
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Figure 3
Probability of Voting in Favor of California’s Term
Limits Amendment (Proposition 28, 2012)
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Table 5 reports the logit regression results for California’s
82
Proposition 29 (2012). Similar to our previous results, only
some of the endorsements we asked about had a significant effect on vote choice. Knowing the California Republican Party’s
opposition to the measure had a significant and large (38% decrease) effect on respondents who had a positive view of the
party (the effect was in the expected direction). Identical to
Proposition 28 above, respondents who had a negative view of
the Republican Party did not appear to use their endorsement
to arrive at a decision. Respondents who knew the American
Heart Association endorsed the measure and had a positive

82. As was the case with Proposition 28, we did not have enough respondents to analyze some of the subgroups, including (1) the effect of the American
Heart Association’s endorsement on respondents who had a negative view of
the group; (2) respondents who had a positive view of tobacco companies and
knew their opposition; and (3) respondents who had a negative view of Americans for Tax Reform and knew their opposition to the measure.
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view of the group (Model 3) were significantly more likely to
support the measure. The Lance Armstrong Foundation’s support for the measure had a significant effect as well: respondents who had a positive view of the group were more likely to
support the measure (Model 4) and respondents who had a
negative view of the group were less likely to support the additional tax (Model 5). By contrast, RJ Reynolds’ endorsement
(Model 6) and Americans for Tax Reform’s endorsement (Model
7) had no significant effect on our respondents. In addition to
the endorsements, knowing that California had already instituted an excise tax on tobacco products resulted in lower support for the additional tax in two of the models. Self-identified
tobacco users were also significantly less likely to support the
initiative in six out of the seven models. When we calculate the
predicted probabilities for voting in favor of Proposition 29, it
becomes clear that knowledge of an endorsement can have a
substantively very large effect, but again this effect is limited
to people who self-identify as supporting or opposing the person
or group endorsing the measure. In fact, knowing that the California Republican Party’s opposed the measure resulted in a
decline in support for the measure of over fifty percentage
points for respondents who had a positive view of the party.
While we find mixed support for the efficacy of endorsements, it
is clear that an endorsement can have a significant effect when
it comes from a well-known source with whom people can identify their relationship to the cue-giver. For many ballot
measures, however, endorsements by presidents, political parties and campaigns by well-known groups or individuals,
spending tens of millions of dollars, do not emerge.
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Table 5—Logit Results for California’s Tobacco Excise Tax Increase (Proposition 29, 2012)

Cue: CA Republicans Opposed
Cue: American Heart Association Supported
Cue: Armstrong Supported

Model (1)
Positive
CA Republicans

Model (2)
Negative
CA Republicans

-2.51***

0.61

(0.73)
—

Model (3)
Positive
American
Heart Assn.
—

Model (4)
Positive Lance
Armstrong

(0.36)

—

—

—

0.91**

—

—
—

—
—

(0.21)
—

—
0.82*

—

—

—

—

(0.33)

Cue: RJ Reynolds Opposed

—
—

—
—

—
—

—
—

Cue: Americans for Tax
Reform Opposed

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Fact: CA has Excise Tax

-0.66
(0.81)

-0.31
(0.40)

-0.55**
(0.20)

-0.59
(0.32)

Conservative
Liberal
Age
Income

-1.45

1.15

-0.53**

-0.96**

(0.81)

(1.12)

(0.20)

(0.34)

-0.59

0.89*

0.65**

0.71*

(0.92)

(0.39)

(0.21)

(0.36)

-0.03
(0.03)

-0.01
(0.02)

-0.02**
(0.01)

-0.01
(0.01)

0.35

0.07

0.08

0.11

(0.19)

(0.13)

(0.05)

(0.09)

Education

0.11
(0.25)

0.19
(0.18)

0.26**
(0.08)

0.45**
(0.14)

Tobacco User

0.28
(0.68)

-2.08**
(0.43)

-1.29**
(0.18)

-1.06**
(0.31)

-4.98**
(1.27)

-0.18
(0.84)

-1.90**
(0.35)

-1.90**
(0.61)

Constant

4.63
(1.89)

-0.03
(0.76)

1.18
(0.46)

0.04
(0.78)

Pseudo-R2

.462

.194

.168

.177

N

115

203

947

349

Political Knowledge

Note: Dependent variable is respondent’s self-reported intention of
voting in favor or against California’s Proposition 29 that proposed to
increase the excise tax on tobacco products sold within the state. Excluded group: independents who were unaware of any endorsement or
fact. Coefficients for state-level political knowledge are not reported.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01
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Table 5 (Continued)—Logit Results for California’s
Tobacco Excise Tax Increase (Proposition 29, 2012)

Cue: CA Republicans Opposed
Cue: American Heart Association Supported
Cue: Armstrong Supported
Cue: RJ Reynolds Opposed
Cue: Americans for Tax Reform Opposed
Fact: CA has Excise Tax
Conservative
Liberal
Age
Income
Education
Tobacco User
Political Knowledge
Constant
Pseudo-R2
N

Model (5)
Negative Lance
Armstrong

Model (6)
Negative Tobacco
Companies

—

—

Model (7)
Positive Americans Tax Reform
—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

-1.40*

—

—

(0.60)

—

—

—

0.34

—

—

(0.27)

—

—

—

-0.84

—

—

(0.56)

0.28

-0.81**

0.50

(0.62)

(0.27)

(0.75)

-0.49

-0.63*

0.15

(0.69)

(0.29)

(0.64)

-1.64*

0.26

2.18**

(0.82)

(0.27)

(0.66)

-0.00

-0.01

-0.03

(0.02)

(0.01)

(0.02)

0.43*

0.05

0.21

(0.18)

(0.07)

(0.19)

0.08

0.32*

0.39

(0.32)

(0.13)

(0.27)

-1.34*

-1.23**

-1.56**

(0.68)

(0.32)

(0.60)

-1.69

-0.58

-2.59*

(1.11)

(0.46)

(1.29)

0.94

0.57

0.33

(1.75)

(0.71)

(1.43)

.210
88

.107
461

.274
113

Note: Dependent variable is respondent’s self-reported intention of
voting in favor or against California’s Proposition 29 that proposed to
increase the excise tax on tobacco products sold within the state. Excluded group: independents who were unaware of any endorsement or
fact. Coefficients for state-level political knowledge are not reported.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01
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Figure 4
Probability of Voting in Favor of California’s Excise
Tax Increase (Proposition 29, 2012)
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Taken together, our data and analysis return us to studying the conditions for when endorsements can substitute for
encyclopedic knowledge of a ballot measure. These results
stand in contrast to the common wisdom in the literature that
voters routinely use endorsements to compensate for their often
astounding lack of factual—or encyclopedic—knowledge. We
turn now to consider what our results mean for policy and legal
decisions and close with a discussion of how our results add to
our understanding of voter decision-making.
III. DISCUSSION
We analyzed whether individuals’ knowledge of an endorsement had a significant effect on vote choice. Our surveys
covered three ballot measures from two elections: North Carolina’s and California’s 2012 presidential primaries. In North
Carolina, we asked respondents about Amendment 1, a constitutional amendment that proposed to outlaw same-sex marriage. In California, we examined our respondents’ evaluations
of Proposition 28—an amendment to the state’s term limit
laws—and Proposition 29—a proposed increase in the excise
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tax collected on tobacco products. We evaluated the effectiveness of ten endorsements in fifteen separate tests of our hypotheses. We found support for our hypotheses less than 50% of
the time, with just seven of the fifteen tests exhibiting significant results. When we take into consideration that our respondents’ knowledge of the endorsements was often quite
poor, it would appear that the effective useful rate of endorsements is even lower than our results imply.
In addition to our data being the largest collection of individual-level research on voters’ decisions on ballot measures,
the subjects of the initiatives and referendum we covered are
largely representative of the types of issues that appear on the
ballots in many states. To date, voters in thirty-five states have
voted on whether same-sex couples have the right to marry.
Four of these states have considered the issue more than once
(Arizona in 2006 and 2008, California in 2000 and 2008, Maine
in 2009 and 2012, and Nevada in 2000 and 2002). The subject
of term limits has also been a recurring question on many ballots. In nineteen states, voters have approved limits to the
number of terms an elected official can serve in the state legislature (four states’ voters have since seen their laws overturned). Tobacco taxes are a familiar issue to many voters as
well. Eleven states have asked voters to approve an increase in
the amount of excise taxes collected on cigarettes. Four states
(Arizona, Missouri, Montana, and Oregon) have asked voters to
increase this tax three times, and California has proposed an
increase four times.
If our results imply that some individuals use endorsements only some of the time, is it reasonable to assume that
most voters are making reasoned choices all of the time? If such
an assumption is unreasonable, as our data suggest, should the
government be allowing citizens to vote directly on important
issues of the day, especially when these votes will often have
far-reaching and important policy consequences? On a more
basic level, can direct democracy hope to measure the public’s
policy preferences at the ballot box? Our results imply that academics, policymakers, and jurists should be cautious about the
average voter’s capacity to decide policy when answering these
83
important normative questions.

83. Taken to their logical conclusion, our results provide a normative argument supporting the limited implementation of ballot measures as dis-
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For further research, the next task is to explore just how
individuals are making decisions in lieu of broad use of endorsements. Researchers have thus far avoided this topic in favor of assuming the existence of the low-information voter who
is armed with obscure endorsements but lacks simple facts.
Similar to the jab at the economist who falls into a pit and fails
to acknowledge the problem because she “assumes the existence of a ladder to climb out,” political scientists and legal
scholars have failed to recognize that we assume the routinized
use of abstruse endorsements to solve the problem of uninformed voting in democracy.
Readers should not interpret our results and analysis as
claiming that endorsements cannot work. The opposite is true.
Our results highlight the fact that endorsements are useful to
many individuals, just not at the rate that many scholars assume. As such, increasing individuals’ usage of endorsements
when evaluating ballot measures should lead to improved decision-making and, as a result, policy choices that better reflect
the majority of the public’s preferences.
One policy prescription—and one we have argued for in
previous research—that can increase the usage of cues in initiative and referendum elections is the inclusion of endorsements
on the ballot. Such a policy change is akin to what already occurs in many candidate elections that display party labels. As
we note above, party labels convey a substantial amount of information in a way that is cognitively cheap for voters to process and incorporate into their decisions. Affixing relevant endorsements to the ballot for initiatives and referendums can
84
have a similar effect for voters in direct democracy.

cussed in ELISABETH R. GERBER, ARTHUR LUPIA, MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS & D.
RODERICK KIEWIET, STEALING THE INITIATIVE: HOW STATE GOVERNMENT RESPONDS TO DIRECT DEMOCRACY (2001); Valentina A. Bali, Implementing Popular Initiatives: What Matters for Compliance?, 65 J. POL. 1130 (2003); Elisabeth R. Gerber, Arthur Lupia & Mathew D. McCubbins, When Does
Government Limit the Impact of Voter Initiatives? The Politics of Implementation and Enforcement, 66 J. POL. 43 (2004).
84. As we note earlier, some endorsements are likely to be more effective
than others. In our analysis of Proposition 29, “good government” groups such
as the League of Women Voters and Common Cause were not effective endorsers. Political parties and prominent political figures were more persuasive.
More work is necessary to discern whether this finding extends beyond our
study, which limits what we can say with regards to what cues will be most
valuable to voters on the ballot.
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The information surrounding ballot measures is often quite
poor, leading many voters to rely on the short title and summary (which is often a few hundred words, and usually less)
85
that appears on the ballot to evaluate the policy in question.
Providing elite endorsements on the ballot is one way to improve the information available to voters when they make their
choices. Placing endorsements on the ballot could be a potential
boon for uninformed voters. For informed voters, endorsements
can remind them who supported and opposed the measure. In
both cases, endorsements increase the amount of knowledge
that voters can consider at the time they decide.
Empirical evidence suggests that such a policy change
would be very helpful for voters. Burnett and Kogan run a series of survey experiments to measure whether elite endorsements reduce the persuasion effects of framed ballot titles and
86
summaries. Their results indicate that the introduction of just
a single endorsement reduces the potential framing effects in
half. This research, coupled with the experimental research
outlined above, strongly suggests that the selection and placement of knowledgeable and trustworthy endorsements on the
ballot itself will lead voters to make better decisions on policies
that they often know very little about.
CONCLUSION
Using two surveys covering three ballot measures in two
states, we reconsidered the conventional academic wisdom that
individuals often use endorsements to inform their decisions in
direct democracy elections. Our analysis provided only mixed
support for the conventional wisdom. What our results clearly
showed is that individuals’ use of endorsements is much more
limited and highly conditional. Our limited findings stand in
contrast to the belief that voters routinely use endorsements to
inform their decisions on complicated ballot measures to overcome their information deficiencies. Put another way, our results challenge the widely held assumption that voters are
competent policymakers who can adeptly use the institutions of
direct democracy to select policy outcomes they prefer. Future

85. See Matsusaka, supra note 15, at 198.
86. Craig M. Burnett & Vladimir Kogan, The Case of the Stolen Initiative:
Were the Voters Framed? (June 15, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1643448.
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research should further establish when and under what conditions voters use endorsements to inform their decisions. Finally, scholars need to forge a new model of decision-making in direct democracy elections that takes into account voters’ limited
use of endorsements.

